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EFFECT OF LEASEHOLD PROVISIONS REQUIRING THE
LESSOR'S CONSENT TO ASSIGNMENT
After more than two weeks of unproductive inquiry, H and his wife
W think they finally have found an apartment that suits their needs.
It includes such desirable features as two bedrooms, fireplace, tile
bath, and a view at a reasonable price. The only drawback is that the
landlord requires a lease. H and W explain to the landlord that they
are only going to be in the area six months and are therefore wary of
entering into a two year lease. Nevertheless, the landlord remains
adamant, assuring them that all his leases contain a provision for assignment. He produces a lease form, signs it, and hands it to H. H reads
the document carefully; his fears are somewhat allayed when he notices
that the form being used is approved by the local real estate association.
Since the assignment provision is crucial, H reads it two or three
times: "[Tlhe lessee agrees not to underlet the whole or any part
• . . nor assign this lease nor any rights hereunder . . . without the
written consent of the lessor."' This provision does not appear hazardous; all it requires is the landlord's written permission before an
assignment is completed. To H, this seems like a completely reasonable reservation; besides, the apartment is just perfect and his wife is
anxious to get settled. Anticipating no trouble six months hence when
he will actually ask the landlord for permission, H signs the lease.
We find, in this all-too-realistic hypothetical, many of the recurring
inequities inherent in the lessor-lessee relationship. Because of the unequal bargaining power between the parties, there is none of the give
and take so necessary to the drafting of a fair contract. The result:
a standard form lease, designed to protect the landlord's rights while
waiving those of the tenant. One of the terms most frequently found
in such a lease, and the immediate object of our concern, is the provision requiring the landlord's written consent to assignment.2
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2. Mention should be made of three topics that are outside the scope of this
discussion but nevertheless deserve further inquiry: (1) The effect of various state
statutes that condition valid leasehold assignments upon receiving the landlord's consent, E.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5237 (1962): "A person renting said
lands or tenements shall not rent or lease the same during the term of said lease to
any other person without first obtaining the consent of the landlord, his agent or attorney." (2) Leaseholds wherein a "special relationship" between the lessor and lessee
might inherently condition assignment upon receiving the landlord's consent. E.g.,
Gerould Co. v. Arnold Constable & Co., 65 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1933). (3) The evolving application of the law in the area of cooperative apartments. Compare Mowatt v.
[5161

ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES

January 19701

This note is organized into three parts. The first provides definitions of the three standards constantly employed by courts in construing restrictions that condition assignment upon obtaining the landlord's consent. The second investigates the present state of the substantive law; each of the four most frequently 'encountered restrictive
provisions is considered individually. The third part presents analytical
arguments for both judicial and legislative change in the law.
I.

Introductory Definitions

From the outset, it is essential that the reader distinguish the
following terms:
Arbitrary
"'Arbitrary' means '[dlepending on3 will or discretion,' [and] not
governed by any fixed rules or standards."
Good Faith
"Good Faith . . . [is] the actual existing state of the mind
without regard to what it should be from given legal standards of law
or reason."4 In conventional usage, the term "good faith" has a generally accepted meaning; it is usually understood to depict honesty of
purpose or the intention to satisfy one's duty or obligation. 5
Reasonable
"Arbitrary considerations. of personal taste, sensibility, or convenience do not constitute the criteria of the landlord's duty under an
agreement [stipulating that consent to assignment will not be unreasonably withheld]. Personal satisfaction is not the sole determining factor. Mere whim or caprice, however honest the judgment, will not suffice. . . . The standard is the action of a reasonable man in the landlord's position."
In interpreting the term "reasonable," courts tend to take the view
that there are very few relevant factors (rent, terms of lease, financial
condition of assignee, etc.) that a landlord can take into consideration
1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135..(7th Cir. 1967), with Weisner v. 791 Park
Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70, rev'g 7 App. Div. 2d 75,
180 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1958).
3. Paul v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 142 Conn. 40, 44, 110 A.2d 619, 621
(1955), quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATnONAL DicrioNARY (2d ed. 1942).

4. Wright v. Mattison, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 50, 59 (1855).
5. People v. Nunn, 46 Cal. 2d 460, 468, 296 P.2d 813, 818 (1956).
6. Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. JJ. Hockenjos Co., 132 N.J.L. 229, 232,
39 A.2d 80, 82 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (citations omitted).
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when determining whether to give his consent to assignment; it may
therefore be said that the word "reasonable" is generally given a strict
interpretation. In one case,7 the landlord sued for possession of the
premises after the tenant had sublet to one of the landlord's business
competitors. The lease contained a provision conditioning subletting
upon first obtaining the landlord's consent, which the landlord agreed
not to unreasonably withhold. When the tenant had proposed to sublet to the business competitor, the landlord had refused to consent.
In upholding the sublease, the court stated that if the landlord had
wished to prevent the subletting of the premises to a business competitor, he should have expressly stated so in the lease; since he did not
do so, his objection to the subtenant was arbitrary and unwarranted.8
II.

The Present State of the Law

In addition to the general restrictive provision contained in our
hypothetical lease, there are three hybrids often encountered. These
provisions apparently can be traced to tenants' lawyers who, confronted
with adverse judicial decisions, sought to insure greater rights for their
clients. Such attempts have met with varying degrees of success.9
This section is not designed to provide detailed knowledge of the
law of any particular state, but is intended, instead, to be a general
introduction to present case law that will allow the reader to follow the
arguments propounded in section III.
A. "The lessee agrees not to assign without first obtaining the lessor's
written consent."
Cases have almost universally held that this provision (A) gives
the landlord a right to be as arbitrary and unreasonable as he wants
in withholding consent.' 0 The bizarre result in Dress Shirt Sales, Inc.
v. Hotel Martinique Associates" provides a vivid example. The tenant,
under a 10 year lease and unable to continue in business, located
7. Edelman v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 252 Ill. App. 142 (1929).
8. Id. at 145.
9. It should be noted that in the absence of a restrictive provision, the common law provided a tenant with an almost completely unfettered freedoni to assign.
E.g., Everly Enterprises, Inc. v. Altman, 54 Cal. 2d 761, 356 P.2d 199, 8 Cal. Rptr.
455 (1960). This paper is concerned with provisions that derogate from that freedom.
10. E.g., Richard v. Degan & Brody, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 2d 289, 5 Cal. Rptr.
263 (1960); Friedman v. Thomas J. Fisher & Co., 88 A.2d 321 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1952); Jacobs v. Klawans, 225 Md. 147, 169 A.2d 677 (1961); Segre v. Ring, 103
N.H. 278, 170 A.2d 265 (1961); Muller v. Beck, 94 N.J.L. 311, 110 A. 831 (Sup. Ct.
1920); Durand v. Lipman, 165 Misc. 615, 1 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Mun. Ct., Borough of Manhattan 1937); Alwen v. Tramontin, 131 Wash. 78, 228 P. 851 (1924).
11. 12 N.Y.2d 339, 190 N.E.2d 10, 239 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1963), aff'g 16 App. Div.
2d 899, 228 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1962).
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what he thought was a suitable assignee and asked his landlord for
consent. The landlord refused, saying that the proposed assignee's
business was unsuitable for the building. The tenant, unable to find
anyone who was "suitable," in desperation explained his financial predicament to the landlord. The landlord replied he would be willing to
cancel the lease-for a payment of $30,000. Having no choice, the
tenant relucantly agreed. In the meantime, however, the landlord
apparently had a remarkable change of heart, for no sooner had the
money been paid than the landlord rented the location to the same
"unsuitable" assignee earlier proposed by the tenant. Understandably
outraged, the erstwhile tenant sued to recover the $30,000. Although
the court found the landlord's conduct reprehensible, recovery was
to withdenied. The provision was found to give the landlord the right
12
hold his consent "arbitrarily, for any reason or no reason."'
Except for dictum in a Massachusetts district court case, 13 and an
apparently controlling decision in Louisiana, 4 this harsh rule is accepted everywhere.' 5
B. "The lessee agrees not to assign without first obtaining the lessor's
written consent, but such consent will not be withheld if a satisfactory
assignee is proposed."
This provision is susceptible to three interpretations. The first is
illustrated by the California case of Kendis v. Cohn, 6 where the court
stated:
The general rule in cases where the agreement calls for performance by one party to the satisfaction of the other is that the
subparty to be satisfied is the sole judge of its own satisfaction,
7
ject only to the limitation that he must act in good faith.'
The second position is best expressed in Underwood Typewriter
Co. v. Century Realty Co.,'" where the court explained that the landlord's refusal would have to be based on more than mere caprice and
whim. The opinion stressed that courts, in interpreting such a provision, would require the landlord to act with reason.' 9
The third position gives the landlord an unqualified right to with12. 12 N.Y.2d at 342, 190 N.E.d at 12, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
13. See Granite Trust Bldg. Corp. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 36 F. Supp. 77, 78
(D. Mass. 1940).
14. Gamble v. New Orleans Housing Mart, Inc., 154 So. 2d 625 (La. Ct. App.
1963).
15. See cases cited note 10 supra.
16. 90 Cal. App. 41, 265 P. 844 (1928).
17. Id. at 66, 265 P. at 854 (emphasis added). See Millers Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Insurance Exch. Bldg. Corp., 218 Ill. App. 12 (1920).
18. 220 Mo. 522, 119 S.W. 400 (1909).
19. Id. at 526, 119 S.W. at 403.

THE H4ASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vot. 21

hold his consent and therefore seems to make no distinction between
provisions of this type and those described in the previous section.2"
C. "The lessee agrees not to assign without first obtaining the lessor's
written consent, but such consent will be given once certain enumerated
acts are done."'"
Few decisions could be found interpreting such clauses, but this
is probably because such a provision presents an obvious condition
precedent, thereby leading to infrequent court contests.2 2 All ascertainable opinions, however, seemed to apply a standard of reasonableness.

23

D. "The lessee agrees not to assign without first obtaining the lessor's
written consent, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld."2 4
Naturally enough, since it is expressly called for, the standard of
reasonableness is always applied when this limitation is used.2 5 Courts,
20. Grossman v. Barney, 359 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1962), in
which the Texas statute, set out in note 2, supra, was not controlling because of an
explicit provision that consent would be given if an acceptable tenant were proposed.
Cf., Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinique Associates, 12 N.Y.2d 339, 342, 190
"It is settled that, unless the lease
N.E.2d 10, 11, 239 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (1963):
provides that the lessor's consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, a provision
against subleasing without the lessor's consent permits the lessor to refuse arbitrarily
21. This provision is also found in another form: "[Blut such consent will not
be withheld if an assignee of the same reputation and financial responsibility as the
lessee is proposed."
It might seem that these restrictions are not much different from that discussed
just previously, calling for consent if a "satisfactory" assignee is proposed. The author
of an annotation in 31 A.L.R.2d 831 (1953)- felt the same way and actually did combine them. The cases, however, indicate that there are concrete differences in interpretation. Compare Reuling v. Sergeant, 93 Cal. App. 2d 241, 208 P.2d 1046 (1949),
with Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41, 265 P. 844 (1928).
22. One such case, however, was Reuling v. Sergeant, 93 Cal. App. 2d 241, 208
P.2d 1046 (1949). The assignment provision stated that consent would not be withheld from "anyone equally as financially and morally responsible as the lessee." The
lessor refused even to meet the proposed assignee, a schoolteacher. The lessee brought
a suit for damages, alleging that the schoolteacher was sufficiently financially and
morally responsible, but the court felt that this allegation was inadequately proven
and found for the lessor.
App. 235 (1931); Ettinger v. Canby Corp.,
23. See Gelino v. Swannell, 263 Ill.
189 Misc. 235, 70 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Mun. Ct., Borough of the Bronx 1947); Reisberg v.
Ownit Realty Corp., 133 Misc. 156, 231 N.Y.S. 42 (Mun. Ct., Borough of Manhattan
1928).
24. For a different treatment of the subject see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 831, 835
(1953).
25. E.g., Haritas v. Goveia, 345 Mass. 774, 188 N.E.2d 854 (1963); Nassif v.
Boston & Me. R.R., 340 Mass. 557, 565. 165 N.E.2d 397, 401-02 (1960); Arlu Associ-
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however, do not agree whether or not a tenant should have a right of
action against his landlord for damages arising out of an unreasonable
refusal to consent. 6
The majority position,"7 based on common law and traceable to
England,2 8 is founded on a semantic distinction. A clause that "such
consent not to be unreasonably withheld" is not considered to be a covenant by the landlord, but a qualification of the tenant's agreement not to
assign without consent. There is, therefore, no action for damages.
Nevertheless, the tenant can assign without consent, leaving the question of the landlord's reasonableness to court determination should the
landlord decide to press the matter, seek specific performance of the
contract, or secure a declaratory judgment that the refusal was, in fact,
unreasonable and thereafter assign without consent.29 On the other
hand, a clause worded in a slightly different manner, "the landlord
agrees that he will not unreasonably withhold consent," is likely to be
interpreted as a covenant by the landlord and hence a basis for dam30

ages.

A number of recent decisions have found the above distinction
repugnant to modem contract principles and allow an action for damages in both instances:3 1 "To rely upon technical syntax, nicety of expression, or semantics as determinative would seem to defeat the intention of the parties as expressed in the lease, and be contrary to the
ates v. Rosner, 14 App. Div. 2d 272, 220 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1961); Butterick Pub. Co. v.
Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.S. 86 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1928);
Treloar v. Bigge, L.R. 9 Ex. 151 (1874).
26. Compare Mann v. Steinberg, 188 Misc. 652, 64 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County 1946), with Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Eastway Plaza, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 509,
158 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct., Monroe County 1957).
27. E.g., Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41, 265 P. 844 (1928); Butterick Pub.
Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.S. 86 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County 1928).
28. Compare Treloar v. Bigge, L.R. 9 Ex. 151 (1874, with Sear v. House Property
& Inv. Soc'y, 16 Ch. D. 387 (1880), and Ideal Film Renting Co. v. Nielsen, [1921]
1 Ch. 575.
29. Mann v. Steinberg, 188 Misc. 652, 64 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County
1946), see Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41, 265 P. 844 (1928).
30. See Hedgecock v. Mendel, 146 Wash. 404, 263 P. 593 (1928); Ideal Film
Renting Co. v. Nielsen [1921] 1 Ch. 575; Treloar v. Bigge, L.R. 9 Ex. 151 (1874).
This semantic distinction is not confined to cases arising under this fourth type of restrictive provision; it has arisen under provisions B and C as well. Kendis v. Cohn,
90 Cal. App. 41, 265 P. 844 (1928) (provision B); Broadway & 94th St., Inc. v. C. & L.
Lunch Co., 117 Misc. 440, 190 N.Y.S. 563 (Mun. Ct., Borough of Manhattan 1921)
(provision C).
31. See Haritas v. Goveia, 345 Mass. 774, 188 N.E.2d 854 (1963); Broad &
Branford Place Corp. v. JJ. Hockenjos Co., 132 NJ.L. 229, 39 A.2d 80 (1944); Arlu
Associates v. Rosner, 14 App. Div. 2d 272, 220 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1961); Rock County
Say. & Trust Co. v. Yost's, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 360, 153 N.W.2d 594 (1967).
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modern concept of contract law."'32 Regardless of the position adopted
by a particular jurisdiction on damages,33 it appears that the burden
34
is always upon the tenant to show lack of reasonableness.

M.

Arguments for Changing the Law

The need for readily available places of business is overshadowed
only by the even greater need for adequate housing; as prices continue
to skyrocket, more and more people are being thrown into the rental
market. All too frequently, as in our hypothetical, they are faced
with a standardized contract of adhesion. There is no opportunity
to negotiate terms; the contract is placed before them and they must
either take it or leave it. If they leave it and go elsewhere, they will
only run into the same contract again, and again, and again. Often
tenants lack education in legal niceties and cannot afford to obtain legal
advice. They must rely on their own experience, and in this area such
reliance often proves to be a drastic mistake. Experience teaches most
people that men are reasonable beings; consequently, most people
expect that a lease will be governed by standards of reasonableness.
They are unprepared to appreciate the intentionally devious traps laid
for them by leasehold provisions that condition assignments upon first
obtaining the landlord's consent. To expect them to be prepared would
be clearly fatuous.
Why is it that leases provide that "the lessee agrees not to assign
without first securing the lessor's written consent," rather than "the
lessee agrees that he will not assign under any circumstances"? Courts
give essentially the same interpretation to both provisions. Could it be
that one is chosen over the other because it is more pleasant sounding,
allowing the landlord to more easily dupe the legally ignorant prospective tenant? There appears to be no other reason.
The following discussion will proceed under the premise that the
qualifying clauses found in restrictions B, C, and D ("such consent to be
given if a satisfactory assignee is proposed," "such consent to be given
when certain enumerated acts are done," and "such consent not to be
32. Arlu Associates v. Rosner, 14 App. Div. 2d 272, 275, 220 N.Y.S.2d 288,
291 (1961).
33. It will be particularly interesting to see whether the next California decision
in this area adopts the majority or minority view. Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41,
265 P. 844 (1928), a majority position case, rests in large measure upon the reasoning
of Sarner v. Kantor, 123 Misc. 469, 205 N.Y.S. 760 (Sup. Ct., Monroe County 1924),
which has subsequently been overruled in New York by Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v.
Eastway Plaza, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 509, 158 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct., Monroe County

1957).
34. See, e.g., Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. J.J. Hockenjos, 132 N.J.L. 229,
233, 39 A.2d 80, 82 (Sup. Ct. 1944); cf. Reuling v. Sergeant, 93 Cal. App. 2d 241,
208 P.2d 1046 (1949).
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unreasonably withheld") are inserted in leases for one purpose-to
circumscribe a landlord's otherwise absolute right to refuse his consent.
They are, therefore, solely for the tenant's benefit and may be waived
by him at his option. This supposition is important since it then follows
that arguments directed toward changing the legal effect of restriction A
("the lessee agrees not to assign without first obtaining the lessor's
written consent") will be equally and immediately applicable to resstrictions B, C, and D. With this in mind, the following arguments
will focus only upon alteration of the legal effect of example A restraints.
The present law can be changed either by the judiciary or by the
legislature. Whoever makes the change can choose from one of two
standards: the standard of "reasonableness," or the standard of "good
faith." Each alternative will be considered in turn.
A. Judicial Change
1. Adoption of a Standardof Reasonableness
Two of the basic axioms of property law are that restraints upon
alienation are looked upon with disfavor3 5 and that covenants are most
strictly construed against the party to be benefited.36 In view of these
principles it is mysterious that in this one narrow area of property,
assignment of leasehold interests, courts have historically been so favorably disposed toward landlords. Commenting upon an early California case," one author said:
[T]he policy of construing strictly restrictions upon alienation
seems to have been overlooked by the court in [this] case ....
It is generally recognized that restrictions of this character are
not favored and are to be construed strictly against the lessor ....
A particular mode of alienation is not to be regarded as prohibited unless it is "by words which admit of no other meaning." 38
Nevertheless, California courts continue to ignore the general policy of
strict construction of restraints upon alienation when they are construing
leasehold provisions that require the landlord's written consent to an
assignment.
In poignant contrast, examples of strict construction are readily
found in several closely related areas. For example, despite an explicit
restriction against assignment, California courts have held that there is
still a right to sublet, 0 a right to assign a sublease that does not itself
35. 6 R. POWELL, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 848 (1969).
36. E.g., Corbin's Estate v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 120, 245
N.E.2d 117 (1969).
37. Weintraub v. Weintraub, 98 Cal. App. 690, 277 P. 752 (1929).
38. 18 CALIF. L. REV. 90-99 (1930) (footnotes omitted).
39. See text accompanying notes 11-34 supra.
40. Stevinson v. Joy, 164 Cal. 279, 128 P. 751 (1912).
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carry a provision against assignment,4" and a right to give a mortgage
on a leasehold.4 2 California courts have further held that covenants
against assignment do not apply to involuntary assignments such as a
sale of the lessee's interest under execution,4 3 or to involuntary assignments after the lessee's death.44 A covenant forbidding assignment
without the lessor's consent was found not to be broken when the leasehold interest was assigned, without consent, by the administrator of a
deceased lessee's estate. 5 And perhaps most amazing was a decision
holding that, despite a provision against assignment, the transmission
of a lessee's leasehold interest by will did not give the lessor the right
to terminate the lease for breach of contract.4" England has gone
even further, holding that an outright prohibition against assignment
was not contravened by an equitable assignment to a trustee.47
Decisions of this type are important for two reasons. First, they
allow a sharp contrast to be made between the rigor with which the
covenants inthese cases are construed, and the laxity noted earlier in the
interpretation of covenants prohibiting assignment without consent.
Second, they implicitly belie the proposition that a landlord should
necessarily have a right to retain control by covenant over who is to inhabit his premises. Further, once it is agreed that the primary interest being protected by the courts is the landlord's right to determine who is to inhabit his property, it becomes readily apparent that the
only real difference between the above cases of "involuntary" assignment and those of "voluntary" assignment discussed in section II is one
of probability-the slight probability that one will die, become bankrupt, or go insane, versus the stronger probability of a voluntary assignment. It is submitted that in this particular area, probability alone is
not an adequate foundation for a rule of law.
Once we have seen how strictly restrictive covenants can be interpreted against the landlord, discussion of two minority-rule cases previously mentioned in section II-A45 proves enlightening. Interpreting
a section of the Louisiana Civil Code,49 the court in Gamble v. New
41. Cross v. Bouck, 175 Cal. 253, 165 P. 702 (1917).
42. Chapman v. Great W. Gypsum Co., 216 Cal. 420, 14 P.2d 758 (1932).
43. Farnum v. Hefner, 92 Cal. 542, 28 P. 602 (1891).
44. Joost v. Castel, 33 Cal. App. 2d 138, 91 P.2d 172 (1939).
45. Id.; Stratford Co. v. Continental Mortgage Co., 74 Cal. App. 551, 241 P.
429 (1925).

46. Burns v. McGraw, 75 Cal. App. 2d 481, 171 P.2d 148 (1946).
47. Gentle v. Faulkner, [1900] 2 Q.B. 267.
48. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
49. LA. CIv. COD art. 2725 (West 1952): "The lessee has the right to underlease,
or even to cede his lease to another person, unless this power has been expressly
interdicted.
"The interdiction may be for the whole, or for a part; and this clause is always

January 19701

ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES

Orleans Housing Mart, Inc.50 said:
But there is an important difference and distinction between an
absolute prohibition of any right to sublease, a right which would
exist under the article in the absence of a prohibition or express
"interdiction," and the provision relative to subleasing in the instant case. Here the lessee is simply not permitted to sublet
without the written consent of the lessor. This does not prohibit or
interdict subleasing. To the contrary, it permits subleasing provided only that the lessee first obtain the written" consent of the
lessor. It suggests or connotes that, when the lessee obtains a
subtenant acceptable or satisfactory to the lessor, he may sublet.
At the time the lease was entered into the lessee had every reason
to believe that he could sublet upon producing a proper subtenant.
Otherwise the provision would simply prohibit subleasing. Under
unreasonably, arbitrarily or
these circumstances the lessor cannot
capriciously withhold his consent. 5 '
A similar restriction was construed52 in Granite Trust Building
Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
It is settled law that unless restricted by the terms of the lease, a
lessee may assign or sublet. A covenant permitting such assignment with the consent of the lessor, therefore, is a covenant for
his benefit and is to be construed more strongly against him ....
It would seem to be the better law that when a lease restricts
a lessee's rights by requiring consent before these rights can be
exercised, it must have been in the contemplation of the parties
that the53lessor be required to give some reason for withholding
consent.
It is difficult to escape the logic of this reasoning.
There is yet another basis for changing the present law. As most
recently evidenced by the new Truth-in-Lending regulations,54 it is becoming more apparent that public policy requires that the unwary consumer be protected from his own ignorance. 55 The doctrine of caveat
emptor is progressively being banished from the marketplace. It would
appear that if public policy requires people not be fooled by deceptive
construed strictly.",
As interpreted, the Louisana code section is stricter than the common law, for
where the common law calls for covenants being construed against the lessor, the
Louisiana position is that they be construed against the lessee. See Owens v. Oglesby,
123 So. 2d 521 (La. Ct. App. 1960). For the common law position, see note 9 supra.
50. 154 So. 2d 625 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
51. Id. at 627. It is particularly noteworthy that the court reached this decision
while following the Louisiana practice of construing restrictive provisions as strictly as
possible against the lessee. See note 49 supra.
52. 36 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1940).
53. Id. at 78.
54. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.12, 34 Fed. Reg. 2002-2011 (1969).
55. E.g., Exec. Order No. 11,349, 3 C.F.R. § 278 (1967). See generally
Symposium on Consumer Protection,64 MICH. L. REv. 1197 (1966).
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packaging or labeling, 56 and that if public policy requires people be
made all too painfully aware of the precise rate of interest they are
paying on their loans and credit purchases,57 then public policy should
also dictate that leases state their terms in forthright, undeceptive language. Once it is established that public policy demands protection of
the unwary lessee, then provisions such as those found in Civil Code
section 1667 and 1668,58 permitting the courts to invalidate contracts
found to be contrary to the policy of the law, could be invoked to overrule existing cases.
Finally, unless we seek to protect arbitrariness for its own sake, it is
most difficult to find any rational basis for the current landlord-tenant
policy. A sublease never releases the original tenant (who apparently
was in every way acceptable to the landlord) from liability for what
the sublessee does or fails to do;59 and if the leasehold contract is correctly drawn, the same can be true of assignments.6 0 Surely, a policy
calling for reasonable consideration of prospective assignees and sublessees would not unduly compromise the landlord. A California court,
however, evidently disagrees; in Mattei v. Hopper6 the court said:
[I]t would seem that the factors involved in determining whether
a lessee is satisfactory to the lessor are too numerous and varied
to permit the application of a reasonable man standard as envisioned by this line of cases. Illustrative of some of the factors
which would have to be considered in this case are the duration
of the leases, their provisions for renewal options, if any, their
covenants and restrictions, the amounts of the rentals, the financial
responsibility
of the lessees, and the character of the lessees'
62
businesses.
On its face the argument is self-defeating. After stating that the reasonable man standard would not be applicable, the court goes on to list
numerous factors that appear perfectly adapted to application of just
such a standard. It seems dubious, at best, to argue that though
the reasonable standard can readily be applied to each factor indi56. E.g., Fair Packaging and Labeling Program, 15 U.S.C. § 1451-61 (Supp.
IV, 1969); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1964).
57. See 12 C.F.R. §H 226.1-.12, 34 Fed. Reg. 2002-2011 (1969).
58. CAL. CIV. COD § 1667: "That is not lawful which is: 1, Contrary to an
express provision of law; 2. Contrary to the policy of express law, though not expressly
prohibited; or, 3. Otherwise contrary to good morals." CAL. CIV. CODF § 1668: "All
contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from
responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of
another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the
law."
59. E.g., Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143
S.E.2d 279 (1965).
60. E.g., Peiser v. Mettler, 50 Cal. 2d 594, 328 P.2d 953 (1958).
61. 51 Cal. 2d 119, 330 P.2d 625 (1958).
62. Id. at 123, 330 P.2d at 627.
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vidually, it will become cumbersome when applied to several in con03
cert.
2.

Good Faith Standard

It is startling to discover that the standard of good faith does not
apply to leaseholds. After all, this standard is implied in all transactions
under the Uniform Commercial Code0 4 and recent tort cases are applying it in the sale of homes. 65 The landlord is needlessly provided with a
formidable weapon when he is permitted not only to utilize adhesion
contracts, but also to purposely employ misleading language in these
contracts. The adoption of a standard of good faith would avoid such
contemptible circumstances.
All of the arguments presented for application of the reasonable
standard to example A restrictions are similarly useful in advocating the
good faith standard. Moreover, since the good faith standard is less
far-reaching than the reasonable standard, it might prove more acceptable. The adoption of this standard would make restrictions on assignments more palatable by arresting such blatant abuse of discretion as
was demonstrated by the Dress Shirt case.66
The adoption of good faith as the standard, however, embraces
one inherent flaw. If the lessor is required to evidence good faith
when the tenant requests permission to assign, he should further be
called upon to evidence good faith in all his dealings with the lessee.
This would necessarily require good faith at the time the leasehold
contract was entered into. It is difficult to perceive how a lessor could
claim to be dealing in good faith, yet require the lessee to obtain consent
prior to assignment of the lease, when the lessor knew full well that
such language would probably mislead the lessee into believing that the
standard to be employed would be one of reasonableness. It appears,
therefore, that if carried to its logical conclusion, the adoption of a standard of good faith would require the lessor to make his lessee aware of
the hidden trap in the lease. Such candid disclosure might persuade
many tenants to refuse to sign leases until provision was made for the
application of the reasonableness standard. If this were the case, the
good faith standard might tend to be somewhat self-defeating.

63. This is especially apparent in view of the strict interpretation courts give to
"reasonable." See text accompanying note 8 supra.
64. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203.
65. See Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 115 P.2d 977 (1941); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
66. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.

[Vol. 21

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

B.

Legislative Change

1.

Analysis of Current and Proposed Enactments

Congress and the California legislature have already enacted laws
circumscribing a landlord's heretofore arbitrary and unreasonable right
to reject a prospective assignee. 67 Outlawing discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, or national origin is, of course, a good start;
but the effort should not end there. As indicated above, even if
leasehold restrictions were not couched in deceptive, misleading terms
(and it is difficult to argue that they are not), there is still little to
justify the present landlord-oriented policy. The law can more adequately protect the landlord's interest by preserving the liability of the
original lessee irrespective of assignments or subleases.6"
In 1927, the English Parliament decided it could no longer countenance a landlord retaining arbitrary power over assignment and subletting under the guise of a seemingly innocuous leasehold provision requiring his consent. It therefore legislated an implied condition of reasonableness into every such lease.69
The proposed American Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code
would go much further in regard to subleases but makes no provision at
all for restrictions on assignments. 70 The subletting section prohibits
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (Supp. IV, 1969); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51-53.
68. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
69. Landlord-Tenant Act of 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 19, sched. 1: "In all
leases whether made before or after the commencement of this Act containing a
covenant, condition or agreement against assigning, underletting, changing or parting
with the possession of demised premises or any part thereof without license or consent, such covenant condition or agreement shall, notwithstanding any express provision to the contrary, be deemed to be subject(a) to a provision to the effect that such license or consent is not to be unreasonably withheld, but this provision does not preclude the right of the landlord to require
payment of a reasonable sum in respect to any legal or other expenses incurred in
connection with such license or consent ...."
70.

AMERICAN

BAR

FOUNDATION,

MODEL

RESIDENTIAL

LANDLORD-TENANT

CODE

§ 2-403 (Tent. Draft, 1969):
"Section 2-403 Sublease and Assignments
(1) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the tenant may sublet his premises or
assign the rental agreement to another without the landlord's consent.
(2) A written rental agreement may restrict the tenant's right to assign the rental
agreement in any manner. The tenant's right to sublease the premises may be conditioned on obtaining the landlord's consent, which shall be withheld upon reasonable
grounds as specified in subsection (5); no further restriction on sublease shall be
effective.
(3) When the rental agreement requires the landlord's consent to sublease, the
tenant may secure one or more persons who are willing to sublet the premises. Each
such prospective subtenant shall make a formal, written, signed offer to the landlord.
containing all of the following, except as the landlord may waive one or more items:
(a) the prospective subtenant's full name and age.
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all restrictions except one that conditions subletting upon obtaining the
landlord's consent.7 1 In giving or withholding his consent, the landgrounds" are narrowly delord must be reasonable, and "reasonable
2
fined and specifically enumerated.1
Each of the codes appears to have strong and weak points. The
comment to the Model Code fails to indicate why restrictions on assignment are not treated much the same as those on subletting. They should
be. The English Act does not go as far as the Model Code, which pro(b) the prospective subtenants marital status.
(c) the prospective subtenants occupation, place of employment, and name
and address of employer.
(d)the names and ages and relationships to the prospective subtenant of all
persons who would normally reside in the premises.
(e)two credit references, or responsible persons who will confirm the financial responsibility of the prospective subtenant.
(f) the names and addresses of all landlords of the prospective subtenant
from whom he has leased or rented during the prior three years, [or, if more
than three, any three of them].
(4) Within [10] days, not including legal holidays, after such a written offer
has been delivered or mailed [by certified mail] to the landlord, the landlord may
reject the prospective subtenant by delivering or mailing [by certified mail] to the
tenant a written reply signed by the landlord which shall contain one or more specific
grounds for the rejection.
If the landlord fails to reply within the [10] days, or if his written reply fails to
give reasonable grounds for rejecting the prospective subtenant, the tenant may, at
his option, terminate the rental agreement by giving written notice to the landlord
within [90] days following the lapse of the [10] day reply period or the receipt of
the rejection reply which fails to state any reasonable grounds for rejection.
[Thirty] days after such notice is delivered or mailed [by registered mail] to the
landlord, the rental agreement shall terminate. The tenant shall be subject to no
damages, penalty, or forfeiture of any part or all of his security deposit or any
other payment for such termination.
(5) Reasonable grounds for rejecting a proposed subtenant include any facts
which reasonably indicate that the proposed tenancy would be less favorable to the
landlord than the existing tenancy, including, but not limited to:
(a)Insufficient credit standing or financial responsibility.
(b)Number of persons in the proposed household.
(c)Number of persons under 18 in the proposed household.
(d)Unwillingness of the prospective tenant to assume the same terms as are
included in the existing rental agreement.
(e)Proposed maintenance of pets.
(f)Proposed commercial activity.
(g) Written information signed by a previous landlord, which shall accompany the rejection, setting forth abuses of other premises occupied by the prospective subtenant.
No consideration of race, creed, sex, religion, political opinion or affiliation, or
national origin may be relied on by the landlord as reasonable grounds for rejection.
(6) In any proceeding in which the reasonableness of the landlord's rejection shall
be in issue, the burden of showing reasonableness shall be on the landlord."
71. Id. subsection (2).
72. Id. subsection (5).
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hibits all but reasonable restraints on subletting. 3 The Act's provisions
dealing with restraints both on subletting and on assignment could
therefore be strengthened. Finally, the Model Code places the responsibility for showing unreasonableness upon the landlord."4 This might
prove burdensome and encourage groundless harrassment suits. The
English ruling that places the responsibility upon the tenant 5 has much
in common with the present American position; 0 it appears to be
preferable to the Model Code.
Conclusion
Today, tenants are being victimized on three separate levels.
First, they are coerced by the shortage of urban housing into signing
standard-form leases that have been drafted to serve the interests of the
landlord and deceptively worded to trap the prospective tenant into
making unintended concessions. Second, mesmerized by the god of
stare decisis, courts seem unable to throw off the cloak of ill-reasoned
precedents and strike out with better reasoned and more just decisions.
Finally, their ears and mails filled with the unremitting cries of organized lobbyists, legislators forget the common man, whose votes elected
them, and unnecessarily procrastinate in banishing caveat emptor from
the marketplace.
It is submitted that the only fair standard to employ in interpreting
these restrictive lease provisions is the reasonable contemplation of the
parties, and that this reasonable contemplation of the parties will almost
always call for the adoption of the standard of the reasonable man.7 7
Beginning with a realistic hypothetical, we have run through the
present state of the law, the four frequently encountered types of assignment restrictions, and the possibilities for judicial and legislative
change. Along the way, we have observed the traps laid for the unwary tenant, and we have attributed their unfortunate longevity to the
recurrent judicial nonapplication of established axioms of property law.
73. Compare id. subsection (5), with Landlord-Tenant Act of 1927, 17 & 18
Geo. 5, c. 36, § 19, sched. 1. See note 63 supra.
74. Id. subsection (6).
75. Shanly v. Ward, 29 T.L.R. (n.s.) 714 (C.A. 1913); Mills v. Cannon Brewery
Co., [1920] 2 Ch. 38.
76. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
77. But see Millers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Insurance Exch. Bldg. Corp., 218 Il1. App. 12,
18 (1940): "It is insisted that the word 'satisfactory' as used in the lease means what
would satisfy the mind of a reasonable man. Our attention has not been directed to
any case . . . in support of this contention. We may agree with the contention that
the covenant not to assign or sublet the premises is to be strictly construed against
the lessor. But this would not authorize us to hold that the term as used in the lease
should be given a meaning not intended by the parties thereto."
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There are abundant reasons and sufficient foundations for changes in
this area of landlord-tenant law. Let us hope they will be forthcoming.
William H. Cotter*
*

Member, Second Year Class.

